Neoformalism SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW these three cases forbid public employers from taking adverse employment action again t employee for peaking out on "matters of public conce ,"7 but only if the employee is not peaking pursuant to the employee's official duti es and lhen only if the employee can prevail under a constitutional balancing test. 9 Needless to say, it is quite a gauntlet a public employe has to negotiate to ucceed on a First Amendment free speech claim.
10
So why have Fi_r t Amendment public employee speech rights, which have traditionally enjoyed protection under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions suddenly diminished in recent years? 11 Three interrelated developments explain tbi tate of affairs. First, a jurisprudential school of thought termed the ' ubsidy school" has significantly undermined the vitality of the conditions doctrine through its largely successful sparring with an alternative school of thought, the "penalty chool."
econd, although initially developed in the government-assovereign context, this subsidy approach to the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has now infiltrated the govermnent-as-employer context and eviscerated large parts of the Pickering holding. Third, and most significantly, the nature of the ubsidy argument in government-asemployer context ha morphed into the govemment speech doctrine, which the government employer claims the speech of its employees as it own and regulates it freely. It is this t tep that I refer to as the Court's neoformalism in handling these con titutional is ues. 2 (2006) (collecting ca e that di cuss the problems as ociatcd with the Connick "matter of public concern" test).
8. See Garcetri 547 U .. at 421 ("We hold that when public employees make statements to their official duties employees are not spea\<ing as citizens for First Amend men! purpo cs, the onstitlttion doe not insulate collliDunications from emp loyer discipline.').
9. See Pickering, 391 U .. at 568. l 0.
ee Paul M. Secunda Whither the Pickering Rights Employees? 79 U. CoLO . . REv. 1101 REv. . 1107 (recounting the difliculty for public employees of ur iving the complicated five-step free speech analysis).
11 . See Mazzone upra note 3 8 10-16 reviewing a number of Supreme outt cases that establish that " [t] hc doctrine of unconstitutional conditions ha been vigorously applied in the fi rst Amendment ca s").
12. Thi Article docs not claim any connection with any other fanner use of the word neofo alism in the constitutional, contract or commercial law literature. ee, e.g., Jolm E. Murray. Jr. Con tract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 7 1 FORDHAM of merely applying a legal principle in a mechanistic or categorical manner, this new fom1 of fom1alism concems itself more with the fonnal ability of individuals to exercise constitutional rights, though practical realities may strongly suggest that cunent realities may significantly interfere with such rights . It is this neoformalism that explains how the once-vital doctrine of 1mconstitutional conditions has come under attack and the long-buried right-privilege distinction in constitutional law has reemerged.
In order to more concretely illustrate the genesis of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and its recent distortions, this Article conducts an indepth exploration of the ca e that started it all : Pi ·kering v. Boctrd of Education.
Although the decided this ca in Marvin Pickering's favor, 14 th re ulting framework has, over the year. been interpreted by the Supreme Court in a manner that significantly limits public employee free speech rights. In fact, this same unconstitutional conditions doctrine has been utilized in the government-a -overeign context to dilute other constitutional rights of citi.zens. 15 What wa once developed to shut the door on the infamous right-privHege tinction 16 has now been increasingly used to rob individuals of First Amendment and other constitutional rights. Indeed, when one also considers the neoformalist use of the government speech doctrine, the civil liberties of public employees in this area oflaw may be at an all -time low.
This Article is divided into seven Parts. Part II defines and explores the development of the neofonnalist approach by a group of conservative Justices. Part III then delves into the story behind the dispute that led eventually to the Supreme Court's landmark penalty case of Pickering v. Board of Education, which established a robust fonn of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in public employee free speech L. R EV. 869, 89 1 (2002) (d iscussing 1439, 1445-5 ( 1968) (discussing various means by which the U. . Supreme Court has mitigated the "harsh con cquence of the right-privilege di tin tion").
910 [VOL. 48: 907, 2011] Neoformalism SAN DIEGO LAW REVTEW cases. Part IV then relates how the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions first came under attack in the government-as-sovereign context through the increasing use of the subsidy line of argument by conservative Justices in these cases. Next, Part V describes the infiltration of the subsidy argument into the government-as-employer context post-Pickering and how the penalty version of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has been distorted by this emerging neoformalism. Part VI illustrates how this neoformalist conception of First Amendment rights has made the govemment less transparent and accountable because public employees are no longer secure in speaking their minds about their public employment.
Con equently it argue r the restoration of Pickering, its constitutional balancing tandard , and th p nalty ver ion of lhc w1con titutionaJ condition doctrin . Only when g vernment actions that practically truncate the con titutional right of public employee are not tolerated will public employees be able to again assume the role f the vanguard of the citizenry protecting fellow citizen om govemm nt fraud a te and abuse.
II. NEOFORMALISM AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
A noted above th Supreme ourt limit a government actor from conditioning governmental b nefit ba ed on individual forfeiting their con titutional right under the doctrine of uncon titutional c ndition .
17
Yet through the recent a cendancy of tbe government peech doctrin in combination with the embrac of the . ubsidy version of the uncon titutional condition doctrine the Rehnqui t and Roberts ourt ha largely cvi cerated the protection again t government implementation f unconstitutional conditi n in distributing g vemmenllarge e.
In thi regard th e ourt have adopted a new version f formali m or neoformalism to achieve the e end . Conceptually neoformali m refer to tho e legal theorists and judges who look for theirs ietal ideal in what ha come b fore: " rooted in the past-/a terre et /es morts-a maintained by Gennan hist icists or French theocrats, or neoConservatives in English-speaking coWltries."
18 However, whereas more 17. See Mitchell N. Be rman, Coercion Without Baselin es : Unco nsritutiona{ Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 2-3 (200 I) . But see id. at 9 (criti cizing the common defi nition of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions as not being ve1y useful).
18. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in THE P ROPER STU DY OF M ANKIND: AN A NTHOLOGY OF E SSAYS 191 , 241 (Heruy Hardy & Roger Hausheer eds., 2000) . traditional forms of legal formalism seek to "identify ... foundational principles, deduce legal rules from them, [and] then apply those rules syllogistically to resolve individual disputes,"
19 this new formalism concerns itself with the formal ability of individuals to exercise constitutional rights f ee f om physical restraint, though practical realities may suggest significant interference with the exercise of those rights. It is this neoformalism that explains how the once-vital doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has come to languish.
Take, for instance, the constitutional rights of public employees.
20
Through a number of decisions over the past four decades, the Supreme Court has drastically cut back on the ability of public employees to exercise rights to speech, privacy, and equal protection. In the First Amendment free speech context, the dynamic can be seen most plainly. In fact, the Court initiated a historical formalistic move in the case of Garcetti v. Ceballos by adopting the foundational p inciple that public employees must be considered as either employees or citizens, but never both.
21 From that foundational principle, legal rules have been deduced such that public employees in their citizen role enjoy robust free speech protections, 22 while those acting purely as employees have absolutely no such rights. 23 Finally, those rules are applied syllogistically in individual cases, so that employees who engage in speech pursuant to their official job description are automatically treated as individuals with no free speech rights and subject to employer discipline for their expression? Court is far more insidious and may potentially have a much larger impact on the constitutional rights of both public employees and all citizens. Neofonnalism's focus is on whether individuals' constitutional rights will be fonnally interfered with by the government's conditioning benefits on individuals taking certain actions. In other words, neoformalists emphasize the formal opporttmity that individuals have to exercise their constitutional rights without considering the practical realities of whether the government benefit program in question inappropriately penalizes individuals for the exercise of those constitutional right or makes it nearly impossible to exercise those rights given their personal circumstances.
Neofonnalism can be seen as deriving most directly from an ongoing debate between two jurisprudential schools of thought about the longstanding and cryptic unconstitutional conditions doctrine: the penalty school and the subsidy school. The subsidy line of thought appears to derive from the belief that differential subsidization by the govemment is permissible as long a aformal opport ity toe . erci e constitutional rights exists outside the program in another fon.tm.
26
ubsidy school adherents, mostly con ervative-oriented Ju tices, maintain that as long as individuals are not fo ally compelled in not ex rcising their constitutional rights, the government is under no obligation to ubsidize the exerci e of those tights. Under this subsidy version of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, in contexts as different as abortion funding to the provision of tax exemptions to public employment, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has become largely in recent yea r becau e government actors simply compel a given result by aying they are doing nothing but subsidizing-or not sub idizing-a rigbt that a citizen or public employee already ha. under the Con titu. tion. 27 Under thes circum if the government can constitutionally induce a result throu gh the conditi ning of a government benefit, it need not worry about directly compelling the result. 28 pecifically focu ing on the constitutional rights of public employee , the sub idy Justices are in e sen e aying that public employment is ub idized' by the government and thu the government i entitled to say what it wi h through its government employee witboul worry of Fir t Am ndment implication . Thi i meaning of the government speech doctrine in its neof malistic form, and its most troubling aspect may be the reinvigoration of the long-ago dismissed right-privilege distinction in constitutionallaw. 29 Conversely, the penalty Justices in these same cases maintain just as strongly that such subsidization significantly and practically coerces individuals with regard to their constitutional rights. 30 So, under the penalty chool, traditionally adl1ered to by more progre sive Justice government may not penaJize individual for exercising constitutional rights by withdrawing various government benefit uch as tax exemption government funding, or public employment.
Ju [VOL. 48: 907, 2011] Neoformalism SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW only forbidden from taking adverse employment action against employees for speaking out on "matters of public concem. "
35 However, if the employees are speaking pursuant to their official duties, they lose all constitutional rights in their speech. 36 The Court has achieved this reintroduction of the right-p1ivilege distinction into the law by contending in its more recent public employee free speech decision Garcetti v. Ceballos that the govemment employer is not conditioning public employment on the public employees' forfeiting their rights to speech but instead is merely requiring its speech-in the mouth of its employee-be used to promote the particular policies for which the employee was hired.
37
This A1ticle therefore suggests that the First Amendment public employee speech rights, which have traditionally enjoyed protection under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, have suddenly diminished in recent years through the largely successful jurispmdential sparring between the subsidy school and the penalty school. In order to more concretely illustrate the genesis of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and its recent dist01tions by these neofonnalistic trends, this Article first conducts an in-depth exploration of the penalty case of Pickering v. Board of Education. 38 Although the Court decided this case in Marvin Pickering's favor, the resulting framework has, over the years, been interpreted by the Supreme in a manner that significantly limits public employee free speech rights. To understand its erosion in the government-as-employer context, however, it is first necessary to understand the growing preeminence of the subsidy school of thought in unconstitutional conditions cases in which the government acts in its sovereign capacity. It is those principles from the sovereignty context that have now infiltrated the government employment context and explain the resulting neoformalism that has taken hold there and cut away vast amounts of constitutional protections for public employees. In both sovereignty and employment contexts, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, once developed to shut the door on the infamous right-privilege distinction, has now been resurrected to rob individuals of First Amendment and other constitutional rights. 
Ill. PICKERiNG V. BOARD OF EDUCAT ? 9
Marvin Pickering is n w an energetic and spirited septuagenarian. In 1964 he was a recently mjnted bigh school science teacher with a strong desire to teach tudent and an idealistic view on the of citizen engagement in representative government. He never expected that his name would one day become synonymous with the U.S. Supreme most important modem case on public employee speech rights. (Board) and became familiar with the problems the Board was having in addre sing variou chool-related issues, how to deal with a rapidly growing student population and the need to raise taxe to build new facilities. By 1964, !he Board and other teachers knew that Pickering was one who freely spoke his mind on a variety of topics, especially when he thought some chool policy wa unfair. TI1e dispute between Pi keri.ng and the Board over how tbe latter was spending funds on alh letic rather than on chool material and teacher salaries seemed to be j ust another instance f Pickering's peaking his mind on something about which he passionately cared.
A. The Background Events Leading to
That dispute, however, tumed out to change the constitutional landscape for millions of public employees in the United States. On October 8, 1964 
1
The letter addres ed a eric of four tax referenda initiated and upported by the Board f Education, which ought to allocate tax money for a variety of chool-related purpo es.
42
Pickering believed that Board and Superintendent had the matter and that tax money wa better spent on teacher alary funding for hoollunchc for nonathlete and educationa l need generall y.
He wrote in pertinent part, in this letter to the editor of eptember 24, 1964:
Dear Editor:
I enjoyed reading the back issues of your paper which you loaned to me. Perhaps others would enjoy reading them in order to see just how far the two new high schools have deviated from the original promises by the Board of Education .. ..
ince there seems to be a problem gelling all the facts to the voter on the twice defeated bond issue, many lcllcrs have been written to this pap r and probably more will follow, J feel I mu t ay something about tl1e letters and their writer .
Many of the e I ttcrs did not give the whole story.
by your B ard and Administration have tntcd that tcachet.' alarie total 1,297,746 for one year. Now that mu t have been th total payroll, otherwise the teacher would be getting 0,000 a year. I teach at the high chool and know this just i ·n't the case. llowcver, this hows their 'stop at nothing ' atti tude. To illustrate fi.trther, do you know that the superintendent told the t ach and I quote teacher that oppose the referendum hould be prepared for the consequcnc . ' I think 41. Pick ring' editorial was publi hed n September 24, 1964, just two weeks prior to his firing. Letter from Marvin Pickering to Editor, Lockport Herald (Sept. 24, 1964 ) (on file with the Lockport Public Library). As discussed below, the lllinois upreme ourt reproduced the letter in whole in irs majority opinion in Pickering. At the time, the Lockport Herald had 2900 ub cribcr See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 39.
42. There were four such referenda involving simila r issu es over a three-year period. In early 1961, the voters of the school district turned down a proposal for the issuance of $4,875,000 in school building bonds to erect two new schools to accommodate freshmen and sophomores only to feed existing Lockp t Central High School, which was then to accommodate j uniors and seniors only. Upon defeat, this program wa discarded. Pickering, 225 at 2. Subsequently, later in 1961, the v ters approved the issuance of such bonds in the amount of $5,500,000 to erect two new chools, one (Lockport East) to accommodate freshmen and sophomores only, which was to operate as a feeder school to Lockport Central, and the other (LockpOJt West) to be a full four year high school. Existing Lockport Central was then to accommodate juniors and seniors only on the East side of the district. /d. "In 1964, proposals to increase the educational and tax rates were twice defeated, on May 23 and on September 19." Jd. at 8 (Schaefer, J., dissenting). 917 this gets at the reason we have problems passing bond issues. Threats take something away; these are insults to voters in a free society. We should try to sell a program on its merits, if it has any.
As I see it, th e bond is ue is a fight between the Board of ducmion that is to push x-support d aU1lctic down our throats with educa tion, and a public that has mix d emotions about both of these items bcca u e they feel they are already enough iaxes and imply don 't know whom to trust with any more tax money . I must sign this letter as a citizen, taxpayer and voter, not as a teacher, since that freedom has been taken from the teachers by the administration. Do you really know what goes on behind those stone walls at the high school? Respectfully, Marvin L. Pickering. 43 So, in summary, the superintendent of the Lockport schools, Dr. William Blatnick, had first sent a letter to the editor of the local newspaper in support of one of the tax referenda. Pickering responded with the letter above, with many accusations of misfeasance and suggesting the Board was placing athletics above teachers' salaries and education generally. Not surprisingly, the Lockpmt School Board viewed Pickering's public statements as insubordination. The Board decided to dismiss Pickering on October 8, 1964, but did hold a hearing on the dismissal, as required under the Illinois state tenure law.
The same seven-member, elected Lockpmt School Board that had already decided to dismiss Pickering held a hearing over two days in the Lockport East High School library in November 1964. Of course, Pickering was not surprised when the Board unanimously decided, on December 7, 1964, to terminate him because the Board acted as judge, and prosecutor during the hearing. The Board concluded that numerous statements in the letter were false and it was in the "best interests of his school" to dismiss him from employment.
44
Pickering's last day of employment was the beginning of Christmas vacation, 1964. During his time away from Lockport Central High School, which period would end up lasting nearly five years, Pickering initially worked for the Campbell Soup Company as a food processing supervisor and then later in the Uniroyal-Joliet Arsenal in the Production Training Department.
!d. at 2-4 (majority opinion). Much of the lllinois Supreme Court majority decision is spent
to establish that Pickering's allegations were false or misleading and therefore the Board 's termination of his employment had been justified because he had not acted in the "best interests" of the school when he wrote this letter. !d. at 4-7 ("A teacher who displays disrespect toward the Board of Education, incites misunderstanding and distrust of its policies, and makes unsupported accusations against the officials is not promoting the best interests of his school, and th e Board of Education does not abuse its discretion in dismissing him .").
44. January 19, 1967 , the Illinois Supreme Court decided in a 3-2 decision 55 in favor of the Lockport School Board. Justice Ray I. Klingbiel, for the majority, held that the school need not "continue to employ one who publishes misleading statements which are reasonably believed to be detrimental to the schools. "
56 Yet, in a stinging dissent, Justice Walter V. Schaefer found that "the State and Federal constitutions require a more precise standard than 'the interests of the schools. "' 57 Justice Schaefer also took the majority to task for deferring to the factfinding of the very Board that fired Pickering and for not pointing to any evidence that Pickering knew that any of the statements he made in his letter to the editor were false. 
B. Pickering at the US. Supreme Court
Oral argument in the case took place on March 27, 1968. The oral argument lasted for some forty-nine minutes.
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John Ligtenberg, for Pickering, framed the argument as a pure First Amendment question of whether a public school teacher had the constitutional right to criticize the School Board and its policies in the local press. In this regard, he 53. Court Upholds Board's Firing of Teacher, CHI. TR!B., Mar. 4, 1966, at Bll. 54. !d. (internal quotation marks omitted). 55. The Illinois Supreme Court nmmally has seven justices, but there were two vacancies at the time of the Pickering case. Of the five justices who heard the case, the justices in the majority were Republicans, and the two dissenting justices were Democrats. Pickering, supra note 39.
56. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 225 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ill. 1967) , rev 'd, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) .
57. ld. at 7 (Schaefer, J., dissenting 
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He al o pointed out that even if ome of Pickering written tatements were false, they nevertheless served the important fun ion of helping the public arrive at the truth of the matter. John F. irri ione argued th ca e for the Lockport chool Board. His argument like the Illinois upreme Colllt opinion, focu ed on the alleged harm Pickering' tatement cau d to the uperintenclent, Board and fellow teachers who supported the tax increase referenda. In essence, Ci icione maintained the essential falsity of Pickering's statements in the letter, though he did not allege the statements were knowingly false. He also contended that because Pickering was negligent in his allegations, the school district had the ability to terminate him so that the efficiency of its services to the public would not be undermined. This argument gave little weight to Pickering and his First Amendment speech rights and concentrated instead on the control that an employer should have over an employee in such circumstances.
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In an 8-1 decision 63 written by Ju lice Thurgood Marshall, the Court held Pickering had a Fir t Amendment right to free speech that could not be forfeited to rvc the 'be t interests" of the school district.
64
Although Justice Marshall recognized that the government's relationship 61. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regent 385 U . . 5 9 (1967) . 62. A number of the U. . Suprem ourt .JuS1i -es ccmed highly keptical during oral argument that tJte medium of communication (oral versu or the audience for the communication (leachet ver us the genera l public) hould make any difference whatsoever. See Transcript f Oral Argument, supra note 39.
f cou e, Justice Marshall' opinion for the majority in Pickering pecifically found that uch differences in mode and manner of public employee speech did not warrant different legal tandards. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U .. 563, 574 ( 196 ) .
63. Ju Lice White wrote an opinion that con urred in part and di ented in part . Pickering 391 U .. at 82-84 (White J . concu ing in art and enting in part). Alth ugh Ju Lice White agreed with the majority holding that Pickering had the right to auth r the letter, h wrote n partial dissent to he di agreed that comments that cau ·e no hould al o be protected by the First Amendment. If public employees retain their First Amendment rights, the question is then, How should the Court balance each of the parties' competing interests? Justice Marshall described the appropriate balance this way:
The problem in any case is to at a balance between the interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.67
To be clear, the governmental interests recognized in Pickering are not in any sense constitutional rights but rather are interests that government employers have in maintaining "a significant degree of control over their employees' words and actions" because "without it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision of public services." 68 The balance undertaken in Pickering is required because even though the government employer perf01ms "important public functions" 69 and consequently possesses far broader powers in its employer capacity tban in it sovereign capacity 0 "a citizen who works for the government i nonetbele a citizen. Consequently, the First Amendment limit the of the public employer to condition employment of that employee on the forfeiture of his or her constitutional rights under this doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.
72
Important considerations in carrying out the Pickering balance include whether the public employee's speech impairs discipline by superiors, harmony among coworkers, close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or the performance of the 65. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (" [I] t cannot be gainsaid that the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.").
66. 73 In Pickering it elf, the balancing cam out in favor of Pickering because (1) th tatements in the letter related to matter of public concernwhether the cbool sy tem required additional f d for tran portation and other educational need (2) no evidence exi ted that the statement inte1fered with Pickering's job duties or with the operation of the school in general and (3) he wa peaking in his capacity a a private citizen. 74 In uch in tance , Justice Mar hall concluded that 'it i nece sary to regard [Pickering] as the member of th general public he seeks to be. ' Perhap equally important, the Co urt majority in Pickering al o noted how critica l it wa to allow public employee , lik Pickering to speak out on matters of public concern becau e uch employees are at many time in the be t po ition to have "informed and definite opinion . ' 76 [n other word , public employe help to en ure the transparency and accountability frcpre entative, democratic government . Public employee wi ll peak out on matter· of govemment abu waste or fraud , but only if they are a that they do not ri k tho e very job every time they p ak. Unfortunately more recent ca developments in e Pickering sugge l that the upreme Court ha not focused enough on thi important a pect of the Pickering decision. The initial unraveling of thi ·trong tatement of the uncon titutional conditions doctrine in the government-asemployment context finds its root in parallel developments in the government-as-sovereign context.
IV. UNCONSTITUTJONAL CONDITIONS WHEN GOVERNMENT ACTS AS SOVEREIGN
Public employee free speech rights reached their zenith as a result of the Pickering holding. Yet, the seeds of their destmction were already being planted in the parallel context of the unconstitutional conditions 73 . See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U .. 563, 569-73 (1968 .. members of a community most likely to have and dcfinit opinions as to how fund allotted to the operations of the schools hould be spent. Accordingly it i essential that they be able to speak out freely on such question without fear of retaliatory di mi al.").
doctrine when the government acts as a sovereign towards its citizen. Importantly, in those cases, the penalty-subsidy debate among the Justices shaped the modern contours of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. As will be illustrated, the holdings in the go vernment-assovereign cases have now slowly infiltrated into the government-asemployer context, primarily through the doctrinal innovation ofthe government speech doctrine. After reviewing the government-as-sovereign precedent, the Article will therefore discuss how the penalty-subsidy jurisprudential divide has come to shape the Com1's modern treatment of public employee speech law.
A. The Historical Foundations of the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions existed in various forms before Marvin Pickering's fateful showdown with the Lockport School Board. Not only had the doctrine been applied the year before in a seminal loyalty oath case involving a public university professor, Keyishian v. Board of Regents 7 but it has since been applied to a wide variety of constitutional cases. These cases involved tax exemptions, 78 users of public facilities 9 and recipients of government subsidies. 80 In these cases, the Court initially pushed back against government attempts to condition receipt of government largesse based on forfeiture of citizens ' constitutional rights.
81
So where does the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions find its judicial roots? Although not rooted in any single clause of the Constitution, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is a creature of judicial implication. 82 In its simplest terms, the doctrine prohibits the government 4, 7 ( 1988) conditions problem ari e when government offers benefit on condition that the recipient pcrfonn or forego an activity thnt a preferred con titutional right nonnally protect from government interference.").
84. ee Lochner v. ew York, 198 U .. 45, 56-57 (1905) (utili7Jng a ·ub tantive due proc analysis to trik down maximum hour law for bakers becau e of it "arbitra y interfer nee with the right of the individual to his personal liberty''). The Lochner ourt con titutionalized prop rty right and the liberty to contract under a of economic ubstantive due process as a means to strike down much social welfare legi ion during the first part of rhe twentieth century. In such cases, the question became, " [W] hen government conditions a benefit on the recipient's waiver of a preferred liberty, should courts review the conditioned benefit deferentially, as a benefit, or strictly, as a burden on a prefened liberty?"
90

B. The Penalty-Subsidy Debate
In answering this foundational question, a considerable amount of dissonance has historically existed between two groups of Justices, and indeed two different schools of jurisprudential thought have sprung up concerning how to apply the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. Socalled liberal or progressive Justices construe the unconstitutional conditions doctrine more expansively and generally find that conditions placed on government benefits represent a penalty on the exercise of individual rights protected by the Constitution. As such, these conditions are subject to strict scrutiny and are usually found unconstitutional.
91 In contrast, the subsidy group of conservative Justices narrowly construes the doctrine and finds most government conditions to be mere "subsidies." As such, these conditions are subjected to rational basis review and are generally upheld as constitutional; although individuals have the right to exercise their constitutional rights, they do not have a right to have those rights subsidized. 
Penalty Cases
The contours of the penalty-subsidy debate can first be seen in the 1958 case of Speiser v. Randall. 93 In that case, 110 Thcn-Ju tice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, made a distinction between whether an organization i permitted to lobby as a result of a law, as opposed to whether Congres i required to pro ide organization with public money with which to I bby. 1 1 Wherea the former involve tbe doctrine of uncon titutional conditions Rehnqui t maintained latter fall into a broad category f case that tand for the proposition that "a legi lature's dcci ion not to subsidize the exerci e of a fundamental right doe not infiingc the right." 1 2 As Rehnqui t later expl a ined in hi di sent in League of Women Voters, [W] hen th Government i imply exerci ing it power to aJlocate it own public fund [the Court] need only find that the condition imposed has a rational relation hip to Congres purpose in providing the ub i ly and that it is not primarily aimed at th uppre ion of dangerou idea Finding such a rational relation hip and the lack of an intention to uppres dangerou idea the majority in Regan upheld the di pute.
4
Subsidy ca e after Regan have failed to hed much on how thi s important di tinction between a p natty and a subsidy can be made in an objective, con i tenl manner. For insta nce in lhe abortion-funding ca of Rust v 119 In this regard, he maintained that "Congress' refusal to fund abortion counseling and advocacy leaves a pregnant woman with the same choices as if the Government had chosen not to fund family-planning services at all."12 Consequently, he applied rational review and found that the government's subsidization practices in this area were rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest and not related to the suppression of a dangerous idea, namely, the promotion of the welfare of the mother and the unborn child.
121
In a later unconstitutional conditions case, the subsidy group of Justices could only muster a plurality. (d (2006) . to the acce to campuses and to student that is provided to any other employer."
129
A number of law chool believed that the olomon Amendment required them to choose between abandoning their policie again t exual rientation di crimination or lo ing a bstantial amount of federa l funding. 130 This tb y argu d infringed on their i.rst nt right of peecb and as ociation. 131 Although Third Circuit Court f Appeal truck down the Solomon mendm nt, holding, inter alia that it ignificantly interfered with the First Amendment expressive as ociation right of the law school in question and therefore imposed an uncon. titutional condiLion 112 the Supreme Court reversed. 13 The ourt avoided the uncon titutional condition que tion altogeth r by deciding that the expressiv rights of th law school were minimally burdened by the pre ence of military recruiter on campus. 134 The ourt concluded a condjtion is not unconstitutional if il can be con titutionally impo ed directly 135 and determined that imposing the access requirement would not violate the law schools' First Amendment rights to free speech or association.
136 It may be that because the group of Justices is no longer able to agree on a basis on which to label unconstitutional conditions cases as subsidy or penalty cases, they are simply choosing to avoid the issue altogether whenever possible.
C. The Penalty-Subsidy Schools at Loggerheads
All in all, when the government act in it sovereign capacity, applying the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions remains fraught with uncertainties and it appea1 that there is no end in sight to tb nt doctrinal stalemate. Even though the two ide in thi jurisprudential struggle agree that government may unequaUy ub idize the exerci e of a constitutional right and may not condition a benefit on the denial of a constitutional right 137 deciding what a penally ase is and what a subsidy case is, the disagreement eems to revolve around whether government ubsidization of certain "alte ative activity deemed in tb public intere t" 13 is tantamount to "coercive interference" by the go ernment with an individual 's constitutional rights.
13 9 Or perhaps put more simply, there is a c rtain lin beyond which government ub idy of an alternative activity becomes nothing s than the govemment' acting in an intimidating manner to interfere with th con titutiona l rights of its citizens.
The abortion-funding ca e are typical of how the line drawing works in these cases.
14° For example, the majority ub idy Justices-labeled the state and federal laws mere ub idjza tion because they did not believe the subsidization of an alternative activity-in those cases, the promotion f child birlh over abortion-significantly impinged on the right of pregnant women t choo e to their pregnancies. 141 This tance appear to derive from th belief that differential subsidization is permis ib le a long a a formal opportunity to exercise constitutional rights exi ts out ide the program in another forum.
142 Such a neoformalistic approach thu first b came apparent dealing with unconstitutional conditions in government-as-sovereign cases.
see also Lyng v. Auto. Worker , 485 U . . 360, 36 ( 198 ) (holding that the federal govemmcnt s refusal to provide fo d stamp benefits to strik ing worker was ju tificd becau c 'strikers' right of sociation does not require the Government to fumi h funds to maximize the exer ise of that ight").
13 . ee Harri v. McRae,44 U .. 297.3 15( 1980) . 139.
ee id at 327-2 (White, J. concurring)· ·ee also ullivan supra note 83, at 143 (noting that coercion has been invoked a justification or .. trik[i ng] down condition that affect righ t lo freedom of pcech, religion and a ciation, but without a consi tent r satisfyi ng the ry'').
see id. at 1505 (maintain ing that labeling a ca c as an uncon tilutional conditions one ba ·ed n concerns of coercion i really just a "conclu ory label ma qucrading a ana lysis").
140. 'ee, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. '. 173 (19 ) ; Webster v. Rcprod. Health ervs., 492 U.S. 490 (19 9); Harris. 44 U .. 297· Maher . Roc, 432 U .. 4 4 1977. 141. See, e.g., Harris, 448 . . at 315-16 (" ]t simply d cs n follow that a woman's freedom of choice ca ie with it a con titulional entit lement to the . financial re ourc s t avail herself of the full range of protected choice .").
142. ee Ru 1, 500 . . at 19 ("By requiring that the Title X gran tee engage in abortion-related activity separately fr m activity rccci ing fed funding. ongre s ha . con i tent wi th our teachings in League f Women Voters and Regan, not denied it the right to engage in abortion-related acti itics. ongrc.ss has merely rcfu ed to fund such aclivitic ut of the public c, an the cretary bas imply required a certain degree of eparation from the Title X project in order to en ure the integrity of the federal ly fund d program.").
Conversely, the dissenting penalty Justices in these same cases believe just as strongly that such subsidization significantly coerces doctors in their free speech rights when counseling pregnant women and also coerces these same women in their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in deciding whether to carry a pregnancy to tenn. 143 As an example, Justice Blackmun in the Rust case found the majority's conclusion "insensitive and contrary to common human experience, [as b ]oth the purpose and result of the challenged regulations are to deny women the ability voluntarily to decide their procreative destiny."
144 This point of view derives from these penalty Justices' firmly held belief that a fonnal analysis under these circumstances is insufficient and that social justice instead requires a more practical analysis of the impact of such cases.
145
Such an approach requires nothing less than considering how the outcome of the case will actually affect the parties.
146
In short, it might be said without exaggeration that the quagmire in which the Court finds itself in these unconstitutional conditions cases where government acts in its sovereign capacity is as fundamental as the distinction between legal formalism and legal realism.
147 Yet, as discussed 143. See, e.g., id (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("By suppressing medically pertinent infmmation and injecting a restrictive ideological message unrelated to considerations of maternal health, the Government places formidable obstacles in the path of Title X clients' freedom of choice and thereby violates their Fifth Amendment rights.").
144. !d. at 217. Justice Blackmun would instead have applied a more searching of scrutiny and, at the very least, balanced the govenunent's interests in promoting a certain type of family platming against the First Amendment rights of doctors and the Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights of pregnant women. See id. at 213-14.
145. In other words, the penalty Justices would argue that it is necess y to practically consider the impact that the nonsubsidization will have on individuals whose constitutional rights may be impacted. This line of reasoning resonates with the political debate between President Obama and his detractors over the need for a Supreme Court Justice to have empathy and to understand the real world implications of his or her decisions. See, e.g. , Janet Hook & Christi Parsons, Obama Says Empathy Key to Court Pick, L.A. TIMEs, May 2, 2009 , at AI ("President Obama, who will choose the nominee, focused not on volatile ideological questions but on personal character, saying he wanted someone with 'empathy' for 'people's hopes and struggles."').
146. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROW NG THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 144 (2002) ("For the Supreme Court, proceeding as it appears to proceed in these [federalism] cases with an agenda, the facts are of minor importance and the persons affected are wmtby of ahnost no attention. . . . The people and their problems that have been grist for the constitutional mill are incidental."); see also Sullivan, supra note 83, at 1497-98 (arguing for a "systemic" approach to unconstitutional conditions, which, among other things, "recognizes that background inequalities of wealth and resources necessarily determine one's bargaining position in relation to government, and that the poor may have nothing to trade but their liberties"). Justice Rehnquist clearly does not agree with Sullivan's and her legal realist compatriots' approach because in deciding Rust-for which Sullivan was on brief for petitioners-he sided with respondents and characterized the case, yet again, as a subsidy case.
147. Although legal fonnalism and legal realism are capable of many different meanings, Judge Posner offers some helpful insights in this regard. He defines legal 934 [VoL. 48 : 907, 2011] Neoformalism SAN D EGO LA W REVI EW above, tbe practical or Tealist approach adopted by the penalty Ju tice i more of a respon e to an emerging neof rmali m in which the ub idy group pays in ufficient attention t the real world consequence of it decisions. And a the id s continue to talk pa t one another the gap in under tanding how to con i tently apply the doctrine f uncon titutional onditions in the government-a -ov reign context persi t . 4 But this neoformaJist-pragmati t divide in unconstitutional condition ca es i not limited to the government-as-overeign context. ince the Co urt deci ion in Pickering the ame divide ha animated tbe unconstitutiona. l condition analysi in the public employment context. A demon trated in Part V the subsidy Justice have al o emerged vi torious in their judicial battle with the penalty Ju tice in a in which government a t in its employer capacity. But in thi area, the u e of the government speech doctrine ha done a substantial amount of the heavy analytical lifting fo r the ub icly Ju tice .
V. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS WHEN GOVERNMENT ACTS AS AN EMPLOYER
In ome way th development of the do trine of un on titutional condition in employment has para lleled its development in the ub idy context. For example ju t a the United tate upreme ourt n e held that govemment benefits were m r privil.ege that could be withheld or limi ted on any condition 149 Ju tice Oliver W ndell Holme on c famou Jy said that in the employment context a per on "may have a con titutional formalism a a commentator to pronow1cc the outcome of the case a. being correct or incorrect. in approximately the am way that olution to o mathematical problem can be pron unced correct incon'Ccl. Ricbard A. P snor, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the lnte11Jretation of Statutes and the 37 CA W. L. REv. 179, (19 6) . Legal rcaJism, in contrast is de(jned as "deciding a ca o that its outcome best promotes ublic welfare in nonlegalistic terms it is policy analysis.' !d. lntcrc tingly, Judge Posner not believe fonnali. m or realism hould be utilized when interpreting statut or constitutional provision but only in developing common law. See id.
14 . See generally Barbara A. anch z ote, United tatcs . Ameri an Library Association: The Choice Cash and Rights, 3 AKRON . REV. 463, 492-93 (2005) discu ing th continuing chasm of view on th proper application of the on titutional conditions doctrine in American Library Association).
149.
ee, e.g., People v. ran , 108 .E. 427 429-30 (N.Y. 1915) , ojJ 'd, 239 U .. right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." 1 50
But just as Supreme Comi precedent has sought to establish the end of the right-privilege distinction when the government acts in the sovereign capacity, 151 the Court, at least initially, arrived at this same conclusion in the government-as-employer context as wel1.
152
For instance, in the landmark public employment case of Keyishian v. Board of Regents, the Supreme Comi stated emphatically: " [T] he that public employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected." 153 Thus, as in the sovereignty context, the government "may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech." 154 The same reasoning that applied to the govemment-as-sovereign cases also applies here: "For if the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited"
155 and "produce a result which [it] could not command directly." S. 485, 496 (1952) (finding "no constitutional infi ity" to a law that required public employees to declare past and present Communist affiliation).
151. See Suga man v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 644 (1973) ("[T] his Court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights tum upon whether a govemmental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege." ' (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,374 (1971) )).
152. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605 (1967) ("[C] onstitutional doctrine which has emerged since [Adler] has rejected its major premise. That premise was that public employment, including academic employment, may be conditioned upon the su ender of constitutional rights which could not be abridged by direct govemment action.").
153. See id. at 605-06 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239 (2d Cir. 1965) ) (intemal quotation marks omitted); see also v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 597 (1972) ("For at least a quarter-centuty, this Court has made clear that even though a person has no 'right' to a valuable govemmental benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which govemment may not rely.')· herbert v. Verner, 374 U.S . 398, 404 (1963) (stating that in the unemployment compensation and free exercise of religion context, "[i]t is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege").
154. See Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 597. 155. !d. 156. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958) ) (internal quotation marks omitted) ; see also Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972) ("[C] onstitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or 'chilling,' effect of governmental [efforts] that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First Amendment rights."); Mazzone, supra note 3, at 806 ('The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions rejects the notion that the govemment's power to grant a benefit includes the lesser power to attach any conditions at all to receiving that benefit.").
936
-- [VOL. 48: 907, 2011] Neoformalism SAN DIEGO LAW REVTEW opposed to when it acts in its sovereign capacity. As already discussed, Justice Marshall emphatically stated in Pickering that "it cannot be gain aid that the State ha interests as an employer in regulating the peech of it empl.oyee that differ ignif cantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the ·peech of the citizenry in general."
157
Although Ju tice Marsha ll in Pickering did not cite to any precedent to upport hi a sertion about the uniquene of the government in its empl.oyer capacity, the upreme ourt on numerous occasions since has affirmed lh i view of the va rying degrees of power that government bas depending upon which hat it is wearing. Wa ers, 51 . . at 674-75 ("[T] he extra power the government has in this area comes from the nature of the govcmment' mission as employer. overnment agencies are charged by Jaw with doing ta k . Agencie hire emp loyees to help d tho e task effectively and efficiently as pos When who is paid a salary o that he will contribute to the agency' effective operation begin to do or ay things that detract from the agency's effective operation, the govemment empl yer rnu have omc power t rc train her.')· see also S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) . Lf it were otherwise, Ju tice PowelJ explain , the government employer would not be able to remove inefficient and workers quickly, and the goverrunent's ub tamial interest in so doing would be fru trated without adequate j ustification. /d. 16 . See Water , 511 U.S. at 672 (plurality opinion) (reviewing a number of irst Amendment doctriJle , such as obscenity, that do not app ly with the ame force in the government-as-employer context, and stating that the employer ' may bar its employee from using Mr. Cohen' offensive utterance to members of the publi or to the people with whom ihey work" (citing Coltcn v. California 403 U . . 15, 2 25 (1971)) Although Pickering came out in favor of Marvin Pickering, the development of the doctrine since then has been generally one of limiting the scope of the balancing test set forth therein. Initially, the Court continued to protect public employee rights through the Pickering constitutional balance. For instance, public employee free peech ca es po t-Pickering have established that the Fir t mendment protects government worker from being terminated for privately criticizing their employer polici 168 for publicly expressing dislike for prominent political figures 169 and even wb n those workers are independent contractors for the go ernment employer.
170
Yet not too long after public employee free speech protection reached its apex in Pickering, a new group of Justices began to whittle away these protection . Fir th Court in Mount Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle made it easier for employer to defend against these First Amendment claim . 171 Under the Mount Healthy framework even if a public employee can show that an employer's adve1 e employment action was motivated by the employee's prate ted speech Ju tice Rehnquist developed the "same deci ion" test to protect public employers from liabi lity in a ubcategory of ca e . Under the same decision te t if the employer can prove that it would have made the same decision regarding the employee in the absence or the protected peech, it may e cape liability.
172 Ju ·tice Rehnquist wrote in this regard: ' The con titutiona1 principle at take is ufficiently indicated if uch an employee is placed in no wor capo ition than if he had not engaged in the conduct.' 173 Next, the Comi decided the "public concern' test of Connick v.
Myers.
174 Recall that in Pickering, Justice Marshall set up the balancing test this way: alway assumed that its premise i correct-that lhe governmem s employer indeed ha broader powers that docs the government a sovereign." Justice White, the partial di enter in Pickering and now writing for the majority in Connick, utilized th icized language above from Pickering to require that the public employee first show that he or she spoke on a matter of public concem before getting the benefit of the Pickering balance. 176 The adopted this new requirement ba ed on the common-en e realization that government offices could not fun if eve y employment deci ion became a constitutional matter. 117 Gojng forward , public mployee speech characterized as being a matter of interest," Like a per onnel dispute would no longer receive the protection of lhe First Amendment.
178
The coup de grace t Pickering however, wa recently delivered by the Roberts Cowt in Garcetti v. Ceballos. 179 In Garcetti, a deputy di trict attomey for Los Angeles County Richard Ceballo , wa ubje ted to advcr e employment actions for speaking out about an allegedly defective earch warrant in a ciiminal case.
Although th Garcetti
Colll't paid l· ip to its commitment to the doctrine of unconstitutional condition in public employment,t 81 Ju tice Kennedy for the 5----4 majority nonetheless held that if employees are engaged in peech pursuanl to their official duties at work, they are not p aking a 'citizen ' and thus enjoy no Fir t Amendment protection for their peech.
182
Because Ceballos wa engaged in speech pursuant to his job duties, he was not speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concem but only a a government employee. A uch the ourt concluded that eballo did 175. Pickering v. Bd. ofEduc., 391 U.S. 563,568 (1968) 
196
The C urt thu doc nothing le s than turn the uncon litutional conditions doctrine n it head by aying that the government employer i not onditioning public employment on public employees' forfeiting th ir 1ight to speech but instead i merely requiring that it sub idized peech-in the mouth of its employee-be u ed to promote the particular p licies for which the employee was hired. Now a Ju tice uter poin out in his Garcetti di ent the c mparison between the ub idization f peech in Rust and Garcetti is totally inapt.
197 Wherea are only allowed to take Title X fu nd if they agree not to promote abortion, most public employees do not take their jobs on the condition that they say only what the go emment wants them to ay.
19 Thj is not to ay tbat uch policymaking public employees do not exi t but employee like Pickering, Myer and eballo are hired to p rform a discretionary function not to the government. 19 . In thi regard. Ju tice utcr notes that"[ ]ome public employee arc hired to 'promote a particular policy' by broadcasting a particular me sage by the government but not everyone working for the govcmmcnt after all, i hired to speak from a govemmcnt manifesto." at 437 (citing Legal ervs. orp. v. Vcla7.qu z, 53l U .. 533, 542 (20 l) they wish to engage in on-duty speech the government does not sanction. To do so, according to the majority in Garcetti, would be tantamount to requiring the government to subsidize employee speech that the government does n t approve. l.:n bort under the government speech doctrine, completely absent in
Pickering the ubsidy school of jurisprudential thought has eviscerated th uncon titutional conditions doctrine in public employment. What is left is a neoformalism that permits the Court to say that as long as employees have a formal opportunity to exercise their constitutional rights as citizens outside of their on-job work responsibilities, nothing more is required to protect them from the penalty imposed by this unconstitutional condition. This neofonnalism is particularly problematic because of its insidious nature. Although much of the Garcetti decision is clearly ba ed on traditional categorical distinctions between citizen and employee: the majority ubsidy Justices also sneak in this observation about t he connection between unco conditions and the government speech doctrine. The problem is that once lower federal courts begin to treat public employee speech as equivalent to government peech even le of a pos ibiJity ex ist that the peech will gamer any constitutional protection. So although public employee free peech right are ntly in the process of fading away, an expansion of this government peech doctrine to encompas mo t government emp loyees would be outright catastropJ1ic for the e emp loyees' constitutional rights in the workplace.
Consider the impact of this neoformalistic approach on just one subsequent case, though there are many examples in the four years since Garcetti. 201 In Haynes v. City of Circleville, Ohio, a police officer was fired for complaining about the incompetence of his superior in reducing training for the canine unit and for asserting his belief that these actions would adversely affect public safety.
202
Before Garcetti, the police officer actually survived summary judgment at the district court level on his First Amendment retaliation claim because he was clearly speaking out on a matter of public concern.
203
After Garcetti, however, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the officer's claim. Once the court classified the officer as a "public employee carrying out his professional responsibilities," 204 from that point forward he was robbed of citizen status and was considered a mere employee without constitutional protections. Remarkably, the court hinted that if 944 [VOL. 48: 907, 2011] Neoformalism SAN DIEG O LAW REVIEW the police officer had taken his gripe outside the police department and written a letter to a newspaper editor criticizing the city's canine program-much in the way Pickering brought his complaints about his school to the public-he could have received First Amendment protection? 05 The perverse incentive thus established by Garcelli i for employee such as the officer in Haynes not to bring their con ern and complaint through internal dispute mechani m but rather to make any workp lace disagreement into a pubJj affair. Altho·ugh one would think uch an outcome flies in the face of Pickering concem f ensuring the efficiency of govermnental service, nevertheless the neofonnalist approach of Garcetti leads to this absurd result.
Vl. EMBRACING THE REALIST CRITIQUE OF NEOFORMALISM
The neoformalist conception of First Amendment rights in the public employment context has made the government less transparent and accountable because public employees are now less secure in speaking ab ut their public employm nt. It is therefore important to restore the vitality of the w1con titutional conditions doctrine through a restoration of Pickering it con tiLutional balancing standards, and the penalty v r ion of the uncon titutional conditions doctrine. Only when government action that practically trw1cate or impinge on the right of public employee are no longer tolerated will public employees again be able to be the vanguard of the citizenry, protecting all citizens against govermnent fraud, waste, and abuse.
A. A Return to Pickering's First Principles
Pickering itself is a penalty case. Consider that Pickering himself was not hired to pa ot the government line of the employer. Indeed, he wrote specifically "as a citizen" when he wrote his letter to the Lockport Herald 206 The Pickering Court recognized that there was a potential of govermnent abuse if Pickering were able to be fired merely because "the best interests" of the school required it. That line of argument, adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court majority in Pickering, would have held the constitutional rights of Pickering and others at the mercy of school officials. The majority opinion in Pickering rejected the subsidy argument and adopted the penalty view that a substantial burden on a public employee's free speech rights would be considered unconstitutional unless narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest.
Not only is the approach taken by the subsidy Justices in subsequent public employee free speech cases not narrowly tailored in that its approach is being applied to employees who are not hired to parrot the government line, 207 but the government interest being advanced is downright inimical to the idea of an open and transparent democratic society. Pickering spends much time discussing the importance of having teachers and other public employees who work for the government inf m the rest of us about the events that transpire in the government workplace. These employees are ideally placed to sound the alarm when government is no longer acting in the best interest of its people. Through its holding in Garcetti, however, the Court has now made it nearly impossible for conscientious public servants to speak out in the best interests of the public without jeopardizing their careers.
Under Pickering, it was not seen as inconsistent that the same person could be both an effective government employee and an outspoken citizen concemed for the greater society.
208 Under this broader conception of public employment, there was no intemal tension within these citizenemployees because when they spoke publicly to point out an injustice in government or to right a govemment wrong, not only were they making their own workplace better but they were making society better as well? 09 The Court itself developed this idea that public employees play a unique role in a representative democracy in Pickering and other cases. 210 Given 207. Justice Souter in his Garcetti dissent suggests ample reason why the govemment speech analysis should be mostly extraneous to the Pickering doctrine. 547 U.S. at 428 (Souter, J. , dissenting). He notes that "[s]ome public employees are hired to 'promote a particular policy' by broadcasting a particular message set by the government, but not everyone working for the govemment, after all, is hired to speak from a government manifesto." ld. at 437 (citing Legal Servs. Corp. v. !d. ("[T] hese citizen servants are tl1e ones whose civic interest rises highest when they speak pursuant to their duties, and these are exactly the ones govemment employers most want to attract.").
210
. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. , 391 U.S . 563 (1968) ("Teachers are, as a class, the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the operation of the schools should be spent. Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory dismissal."); see also City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (per 
